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Abstract 
A mere look at electoral results on both the national and European level of many European 
countries shows that populist and right-wing parties’ support has been growing extensively. The 
French Front National (FN), which has made significant strides since Marine Le Pen took over 
the party’s leadership, is often seen as on the forefront of this movement, and is deemed to be a 
core part of the contemporary European extreme right.  Although their individual agendas and 
rhetoric differ from that of the FN, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the German 
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) are often placed in the same party 
family. Disregarding this hotly debated terminology, however, this paper seeks to identify 
specific differences and overlaps among the three parties. Examining specific agenda points, 
most prominently their anti-immigration rhetoric and stance toward the EU, the party programs 
are used as a starting point to assess to what extent the three parties can justifiably be classified 
as part of an anti-globalization movement. 
Prior to examining the parties’ positions concerning specific issues, an influx in immigration, 
increased integration into the European Union, resulting in a transfer of some national powers to 
the supranational level, as well as growing xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Americanism 
have sometimes been identified as consequences of globalization; negative attitudes toward this 
development, increased nationalism, and policy proposals designed to halt these effects were 
deemed as highly indicative of a radical rejection of globalization. Following a comparative 
analysis of the three parties’ positions, the discussion shows that the French “Front National” 
fulfills the given criteria to a much greater extent than the other two, and its ethnic-based, 
Francocentric rhetoric is much more extreme than that of its counterparts. Nevertheless, a future 
radicalization in the UK and Germany is conceivable, particularly since Islamophobia is 
especially pronounced in the three countries under investigation, and as refugee crises in the 
Mediterranean Sea are leading to an increased foreign presence in said countries, perhaps 
sparking similar ethnic intolerance as is propagated by the FN. 
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Introduction & Rationale 
The issue of increasing political support for right-wing parties in Europe is important because it 
signals a distressing dissatisfaction with the current political system. It is especially important 
that such a movement, primarily directed against the cultural elements of globalization, is 
forming in Europe, where citizens of all member states benefit from freedom of movement and 
numerous other advantages of European integration. But clearly, national and regional identities 
have not been superseded by a common European identity, and thus continue to play an 
important role in national politics, especially in the language used by right-wing parties. 
Additionally, overcrowding and other negative effects associated with immigration, as well as 
the 2008 financial crisis, have further sown doubts about the European project. As a result, this 
project seeks to analyze to what extent a select few parties could be considered a part of this 
movement against globalization.  
 
In general, radical right-wing parties are continuing to cement their support in many European 
democracies, with France’s aggressive Front National (FN) being on the forefront of the 
discussion about this development. Up until recently, Germany was thought to be the exception 
to Europe-wide radicalization with extreme right-wing parties’ limited electoral successes 
contained to subnational levels and vocal anti-immigration and anti-EU positions less visible at 
the national level. This changed in 2013, when the Alternative for Germany AfD, a newly 
formed party, campaigned for a fundamental reorganization of the Eurozone and has since made 
headlines for expressing sympathy for supporters of the German Pegida movement. Likewise, 
UKIP, vocal about drastically reducing immigration and known for its anti-EU rhetoric, has 
made electoral advances in UK elections in the last few years. 
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Undoubtedly, FN, UKIP and AfD differ significantly regarding their histories, political agendas 
and party structures. In fact, FN is widely regarded as a right-wing party1, while UKIP’s and the 
AfD’s membership in the far-right Populist Party family is more contested2. Nevertheless, they 
share many similarities in that they have emerged as a strong opposition force to established 
parties in the mainstream and consider themselves to be the true voice of the people. An in-depth 
analysis of policy positions is thus necessary to assess to what extent these parties’ platforms can 
be deemed a radical reaction to globalization. Indicators for such a response would primarily be 
calls for far-reaching limits on immigration and Islamophobic rhetoric. Additionally, Euro-
skepticism as an emerging ideology must also be examined in its varying appearances, with anti-
American sentiments examined as another possible manifestation of anti-globalization attitudes. 
 
Methodology 
The present study relies heavily on qualitative approaches, as its primary goal is to compare the 
three parties’ positions on immigration, and to assess whether they can be deemed Islamophobic 
or racist, whether Euro-skepticism is a pervasive characteristic, and whether anti-American 
sentiment can be observed. Thus, in addition to secondary source material, the study draws from 
the parties’ own websites and interviews with their leader to gain a better understanding of the 
parties’ standpoints on said issues. Regarding the French Front National, there is more reliance 
on interviews and secondary sources, as their website is not published in English. However, 
quantitative data is also included in order to examine how the three countries’ public support for 
said issues compares to the parties themselves, and whether anti-globalization sentiments are 
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restricted to populist parties or more pervasively observable among the general public. This part 
of the analysis draws from Eurobarometer surveys and other polling agencies’ data.   
 
Literature Review 
Much has been written about the French Front National (FN), while the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) has only lately received significant popularity, and the German Alternative for Germany 
(Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) itself is only just over two years old. Taking these 
developments into account, I will attempt to provide a balanced summary and analysis of books 
and journal articles addressing each one of the three parties and their connection to globalization. 
Edward G. DeClair’s Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the 
French National Front examines the party’s voter base and agenda in detail. Exploring the 
Front’s agenda, the author argues that “the party has modified its political message to profit from 
a growing sense of French anxiousness about the country’s political and economic future”3, 
while asserting that reducing the party’s political agenda to the sole issue of immigration does 
not hold up in light of “detailed, face-to-face interviews with the core leadership of the Front 
(145).” DeClair not only explores which issues are important to the Front, but also analyzes to 
what extent the party’s claim to “really say what all French men and women are actually 
thinking” (117) holds true by contrasting important issues identified by the Front’s elite with the 
French public’s views according to Euro-Barometer.  Even though his chart shows that the 
public’s view differs significantly from the Front’s on some issues, the author is correct to claim 
that the Front’s assertion that it speaks on behalf of its countrymen and women is not too far-
fetched given that there is an alarming overlap in “divisive political issues such as immigration, 
security and violence, and racism, issues that have in fact served as the Front’s philosophical and 
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political core” (118). While DeClair’s analysis also showed that “the National Front is most out 
of touch with the total French electorate when it comes to issues dealing with moral concerns” 
(130), the public’s apparent shared concern for the aforementioned issues, which are essential to 
the FN’s identity, is especially important for the purpose of this research project. DeClair’s 
findings that immigration “was the leading political problem facing France” (134) according to 
the Front’s leadership and supporters must then be analyzed within the framework of the FN’s 
contemporary agenda. Thus, while DeClair’s conclusions concerning the party’s platform may 
not be entirely applicable given the changes it underwent since Marine Le Pen has become the 
party’s president, they provide a relevant historic overview of the party’s anti-globalization 
sentiments. Simon Bornschier’s Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural 
Conflict in Western Europe argues that European right-wing parties, particularly the FN in 
France, have benefited greatly from a shifting emphasis away from economics and towards a 
new cultural divide. Specifically, he refers to a new cultural cleavage having formed during the 
1960s that “pits universalistic conceptions of community against traditional, nationalistic ones”4 
and has strengthened right-wing parties’ ability to mobilize supporters regardless of their 
socioeconomic status. Applying this framework of libertarian-universalistic vs traditionalist-
communitarian values, Bornschier finds that the FN has been “situated at the extreme of the 
political spectrum” “farthest away from cultural liberalism” (40) with its opposition to 
immigration as one of its defining features. Published prior to the AfD’s establishment in 2013, 
Bornschier's study notes that “the [German] Union’s [CDU] location is similar to the location 
occupied by the populist right in other countries and, in fact, appears to leave little room for 
populist right parties (46).” While Bornschier’s emphasis on a cultural divide explains the FN’s 
increased popularity in recent years, it does not appear to have foreseen the emergence of the 
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AfD, a party whose platform Germany’s traditional political parties have criticized as populist 
and nationalist,5 but which emphasizes its classical liberal policy proposals. Nevertheless, 
Bornschier’s framework is useful for this research project, as anti-immigration sentiments and 
Islamophobia have undoubtedly contributed to the Front National’s emergence as a serious 
political contender in France, and to UKIP’s significant electoral successes in Great Britain. 
 
Turning away from France and towards Germany, Arzheimer’s article, “The AfD: Finally a 
Successful Right-Wing Party in Europe?,” takes a closer look at the AfD’s manifesto for its 
participation in the 2014 elections for the European Parliament. Specifically, Arzheimer analyses 
frequently-used terms in the manifesto for their potential overlap with other German parties’ 
priorities and in order to gain a greater understanding of the party’s position along the 
ideological spectrum. Compared to the eight other political parties’ top five words used, 
Arzheimer finds that “the party’s manifesto places it firmly at the far right of the political 
spectrum” (544). Against the backdrop of right-wing extremism and populism, however, 
Arzheimer asserts that “the section on immigration and asylum also strikes a rather conciliatory 
tone” (545), which along with its modest demands in other relevant areas prompt him to 
conclude that the “AfD is therefore not a Radical Right, let alone an Extreme Right party” (546) 
and that “there is nothing in the manifesto that would appear as particularly populist in that 
sense” (546). Lastly, Arzheimer finds that “[r]emarkably, the AfD shows an unusual degree of 
sympathy for Russia and distrust for the US (548).” Arzheimer’s analysis shows that the AfD’s 
2014 manifesto is far more restrained than, for example, the much more aggressively nationalist 
FN. Despite its comparably cautious positions on immigration, the statements made in last year’s 
manifesto do not take into account the party’s expressed support for Pegida. A new assessment 
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of the AfD’s policy positions as well as its leadership’s publicly communicated attitudes toward 
the concept of “cultural differentialism,” which Bornschier defines as “not claiming the 
superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their 
distinctive traditions” (23) is thus in order. 
1 
Almost sandwiched in between the more restrained AfD and the radical FN, UKIP has become a 
significant force in British politics. Although Britain is not known for the kinds of Europhile 
attitudes expressed by mainstream parties in continental Europe, “UKIP is identified with the 
current of ‘hard’ Euro-scepticism, also called ‘Euro-rejectionism’, which rejects both the 
principle of ever closer union as well as the current state of the EU institutions”.6 In its 
opposition to the EU as a force preventing the UK from engaging in “genuine free trade”7 and 
whose membership “holds us back in the world” (7). UKIP clearly uses the language of 
economic globalization to emphasize its positions. Despite the party’s espousal of classic free 
trade positions, however, UKIP engages in an “exclusionary [rather than globalist] rhetoric”8 
when it comes to immigration, painting the issue “as a threat to effective nationhood itself” 
(193). Consequently, EU membership is linked to free movement and mass immigration, thereby 
“flooding” the UK, whilst simultaneously shackling the UK economically. While the 
advancement of nativist causes is clearly on UKIP’s agenda, existing literature has thus far not 
suggested the party is blatantly racist or fascist, unlike the British National Party (BNP). In fact, 
“the attitudes of UKIP voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections fell squarely between 
the Conservatives and the BNP on core radical right issues: xenophobic hostility to immigrants; 
populist hostility to elites; and racial prejudice against minorities,”9 making UKIP a more 
                                                          
11111  
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moderate force than the radical right British National Party (BNP), but a more aggressively 
xenophobic one than other established parties. According to Ford, UKIP-leader Nigel Farage’s 
ability to “raise similar contentious questions about immigration, Islam and identity in 
mainstream political forums” (Ford) without inviting comparisons to fascism are due to “his 
roots in a more legitimate tradition of Eurosceptic politics” (Ford). Drawing support mainly from 
the working class, “British-born and [those] that seem socially, culturally, economically, and 
spatially distant from immigration hotspots such as London,”10 UKIP is further united with the 
AfD and FN in its claim to speak on behalf of their fellow countrymen and women, cleverly 
inserting language about elitism and the political establishment’s obliviousness to their people’s 
needs. 
 
Analysis 
After reviewing existing literature on each of the three parties in question and loosely exploring 
their connection to anti-globalization sentiments, this subsequent section examines and compares 
specific policy positions. Findings are then discussed and ultimately assessed within the 
framework of anti-globalization rhetoric. 
 
 
Xenophobia and Islamophobia 
As mentioned before, Germany is deemed a curious exception in Europe, with no strong right-
wing party with clearly xenophobic tendencies among established political parties. The AfD, 
established only in 2013, has challenged that perception. While it has maintained that it would 
not form alliances with European xenophobic parties ahead of the 2014 elections for European 
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Parliament,11 its expression of sympathy for the Pegida movement, which opposes Muslim 
immigration in an effort to prevent what they perceive as further Islamification of the West, is 
indicative of general, if only mild antipathies held toward Muslim immigrants. In the wake of the 
terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, regional AfD-leader and one of the party’s co-founders 
Alexander Gauland was quoted saying “This bloodbath proves that those who laughed at or 
ignored the fears of so many people about a looming danger of Islamism were wrong,”12 thereby 
providing further indication of the party’s xenophobic tendencies. Nevertheless, party leaders are 
keen to distance themselves from the xenophobic elements within Pegida and their own party, 
with the party’s deputy chairman expressing concerns that “it cannot be ruled out that [the 
demonstrations] have a xenophobic or even racist aftertaste” (es ist “nicht auszuschließen“, dass 
die Proteste einen „ausländerfeindlichen oder gar rassistischen Beigeschmack“ haben)13, which 
undermines the protesters’ legitimate concerns. Given the fact that high-profile members 
contradict one another concerning their views of Islam as an inherent threat to the West, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the party can be considered Islamophobic. However, in the AfD’s 
official manifesto, there is no evidence of propagation of the idea of cultural differentialism,14 to 
which dominant European right-wing parties subscribe. Only once does the AfD’s party program 
for the election to the European Parliament in 2014 mention “the fundamental values of the 
Christian West.”15 But despite this officially subdued rhetoric, some elements within the party 
are distinctly more Islamophobic. As Arzheimer remarks, 
But now, we’re apparently down to two “wings”: Lucke’s economic liberals (who are 
also socially conservative), and those who want a tougher, more nationalist party. 
Incidentally, this split seems to be reinforced by an East-West conflict within the AfD, 
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with the electorally successful Eastern chapters more inclined to play the right-wing 
populist card.16 
In addition to the possibility of factionalization over issues related to xenophobia, a study 
conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation also found that “the AfD’s followers harbour 
above-average sympathies for nearly all facets of right-wing extremist ideology.”17 As the table 
below shows (translated from the foundation’s report) AfD sympathizers’ xenophobic tendencies 
were almost twice as pronounced as those of the conservative CDU’s supporters18. Thus, while 
xenophobic elements are not visible in the party’s program, they have certainly shaped the 
discussion, indicating that xenophobia may take up a greater role in the future. 
 CDU/CSU1 
(n=384) 
SPD2 
(n=352) 
FDP3 
(n=100) 
The Greens 
(n=238) 
The 
Left 
(n=147) 
NPD4 
(n=17) 
AFD5 
(n=68) 
Support for 
dictatorship 
5 2 3.5 2.3 4.3 20.3 9.5 
Chauvinism 14.1 11.9 15.1 1.5 3.2 56.2 41.2 
Xenophobia 8.8 4.5 9.8 1.7 6 72.8 15.9 
Anti-Semitism 4.7 1 0.8 0.8 3.7 30 9 
Social 
Darwinism 
4.1 2.2 0 0 0 0 3.1 
Belittlement of 
National 
Socialism 
1.3 0.9 3.2 1.4 0 14 14.3 
 
Legend: 1 Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, 2 Social Democratic Party of 
Germany, 3 Free Democratic Party, 4 National Democratic Party of Germany, 5 Alternative for 
Germany 
 
Table 1: Right-Wing Attitudes among Survey Participants with different Party Associations. 
Numbers are percentages. 
http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/pdf_14/FragileMitte-FeindseligeZustaende.pdf 
In contrast to the AfD, the case of the French Front National is less ambiguous. Under Marine Le 
Pen’s father Jean-Marie’s leadership, the party was more vehemently anti-Semitic, an image his 
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daughter is now feverishly trying to repair, even if broad segments of the party’s electorate 
display anti-Semitic views to a much greater extent than the French political mainstream.19 But 
despite Le Pen’s current efforts to “to ‘de-demonize’ the FN by banishing outright racists from 
the party and abandoning the scarcely coded anti-Semitic and Islam-baiting language of her 
father,”20 the party’s political agenda clearly emphasizes Frenchness and seeks to exclude 
foreign elements in their different manifestations, most prominently, however, by severely 
restricting immigration and non-French citizens’ access to social services. It is especially the 
focus on African immigrants that exposes the Front National’s xenophobic traits. But even legal 
non-citizens already residing in France will be affected by the Front National’s nationalist 
policies, as the party aims to require citizenship in order to qualify for services such as family 
benefits, an essential component of the French social security system.21 In addition to 
xenophobia in more general terms, the FN has also been closely associated with Islamophobia, 
which has been on the rise in France, a country whose commitment to laïcité (secularism) is an 
integral part of its self-understanding.22 Le Pen has addressed the matter, saying that Islam and 
French values are principally compatible, if “all demands that aim to shatter secularism – 
demands for different clothes, demands for special food, demands for prayer rooms [are 
opposed]. Demands that create special rules that would allow Muslims to behave differently.”23 
Hence, it is appropriate to apply Bornschier’s idea of cultural differentialism, since belonging to 
the Muslim faith appears acceptable only if the de facto state religion of laïcité is adopted. Only 
fully assimilated Muslims, or immigrants as a whole, can be considered French. Such radical 
opposition to multiculturalism and the disregard of any possible benefits of foreign cultural 
influences, clearly in line with the FN’s notion of French exceptionalism, can definitely be 
interpreted as a manifestation of xenophobia. 
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Like the Front National and the AfD, UKIP, too, has had to fight against claims that it is racist 
and xenophobic. Even in its official party program, it notes “even our prime ministers have 
labelled good, decent people ‘closet racists’ and ‘bigots.’”24 These allegations and the party’s 
proposed limits on immigration have forced UKIP to state explicitly that “Immigration is not 
about race; it is about space” (UKIP, 11) in their party program. Whether UKIP is indeed racist 
remains a hotly debated topic in the UK, with a BBC article, for example, writing that “UKIP 
would scrap much of the legislation designed to prevent racial discrimination in work”;25 a 
statement that UKIP-leader Nigel Farage claims “had been ‘willfully misinterpreted’ (BBC 
News). Nevertheless, UKIP faces similar allegations of racism as the AfD, a problem for the 
party that has been exacerbated by the fact that the party’s image has continuously been tainted 
by the emergence of party members’ racist or sexist comments, particularly on social media.26 
 
Anti-Immigration Policies 
Considering the three parties’ specific immigration reform proposals, there are both decisive 
differences and clear overlaps. Clearly, the FN displays the most unreserved attitudes towards 
enacting strict limits. Whereas the AfD, for example, uses more equivocal language to illustrate 
its position on extra-European immigration, nevertheless expressing a fear that foreigners are 
immigrating “into the German social systems,” the Front National’s views are, according to the 
English language summary provided by France24, much more overtly protectionist. Unlike 
UKIP and the AfD, which advocate for the continued immigration of highly-skilled persons, the 
Front National seeks to restrict immigration to nominal amounts (10,000 per year) without a 
clear regard for professional qualifications. The FN’s anti-EU sentiments are also evidenced by 
its rejection of the Schengen Agreement which permits the free movement of persons across the 
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EU.27 Reinstating national borders across the EU would also have consequences for immigration 
and give France the ability to set its own policies regarding the issue autonomously. Particularly 
controversial is the FN’s proposal to “Ban dual nationality for non-Europeans, which would 
particularly affect citizens of former French colonies in Africa” (France24).  
 
The party’s tough stance on immigration and indeed its specific proposals are extremely similar 
to those of UKIP. For the British party, leaving the European Union is of principal importance 
and emphasized throughout its manifesto; clearly, this intention also finds application in its 
immigration reform proposals. Like the FN, UKIP seeks to cap immigration and highlights the 
fact that it supports a non-discriminatory approach that no longer allows for preferential 
treatment of European immigrants as part of Schengen.28 Distinctly different from the FN, 
however, is the fact that UKIP considers immigration a vital necessity with clear benefits if 
controlled, insisting, “Immigration is not about race: it is about space. Immigrants are not the 
problem, it is the current immigration system that is broken” (UKIP, 10). 
 
For the German AfD, immigration reform is an important part of their program, too, but its 
proposals are markedly less strict than the others. The 2014 program acknowledges the need for 
greater immigration given demographic developments within Germany. Like UKIP, which seeks 
to ensure that “all new migrants to Britain will have to make tax and national insurance 
contributions for five consecutive years before they will become eligible to claim UK benefits, or 
[have] access to more than non-urgent NHS services (UKIP, 12), and even specifically identifies 
“health tourism” as a significant enough problem (UKIP, 16), the AfD expresses concerns about 
“immigration into the German social systems”.29 To combat this apparent development, the AfD 
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proposes that in Germany, too, benefits should be given only to those who “have paid taxes or 
made social security payments in Germany to a considerable extent, or if their parents have done 
so” (AfD, 15). Another similarity between the British and German parties’ policy proposals is 
their joint support for the adoption of an immigration law based on a point system on the 
Canadian model and which equally takes into account German [or British, respectively] interests 
and “the likelihood that the immigrants will be able to integrate successfully into our society” 
(AfD, 15). Moreover, the AfD is also concerned about EU intrusion into German legislation 
concerning immigration (15), but emphasizes solely the need for stricter extra-European 
immigration controls, with intended limits on intra-European immigration not explicitly 
mentioned. 
 
Anti-Euro and/or Anti-EU Sentiments 
According to its 2014 party manifesto, they AfD perceives the introduction of a uniform 
monetary policy as a “disaster (4), alleging “the single currency euro destroys Europe’s 
foundation. It generates strife and resurrects national prejudices. Welfare and peace among the 
member states in the euro zone are endangered” (AfD, 4). As a solution, co-founder Lucke 
proposes the exclusion of economically poorly performing Southern European countries, above 
all Greece, from the Eurozone, which would allow said states to emerge with more positive trade 
balances, make them more competitive, and allow them to initiate their own financial reforms 
independent of the EU.30 Not only would a smaller monetary union that excludes Greece and 
other states benefit Germany and other economic powerhouses; an unwillingness to further 
support bailout packages would, according to Lucke, lead to Greece’s voluntary, not forced, 
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withdrawal from the Eurozone, freeing it from imposed austerity measures and allowing greater 
self-determination in establishing economic policies (Lucke and Snowen).  
 
Lucke and his party’s demands for greater democratization of EU institutions and transparency, 
too, are related to the perceived detrimental introduction of the euro in member-states who had 
not met the Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) convergence criteria. The AfD’s 
commitment to profound revisions of the European monetary union is evident throughout their 
entire manifesto. Criticizing the European Union’s democratic deficit directly relates to its 
imposition of austerity measures in southern European countries alongside the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. Warning about the emergence of a “United 
States of Europe,” the AfD alleges that measures designed to rescue the euro at seemingly 
whatever cost are “not subject to any significant parliamentary control. [European institutions] 
are the large pillars undergirding the construction of a European economic regime, to erect a 
centralistic, bureaucratic and technocratic European super state that is too remote from the 
citizens and undemocratic.”31 
 
Resonating with this language, FN leader Le Pen goes even further, speaking of a “European 
Soviet Union.”32  The difference between the AfD’s and FN’s views concerning the EU are 
nevertheless enormous. While the AfD’s manifesto indicates an understanding for other states 
that have expressed a desire to leave “this EU,”33 it advocates for an expansion of citizen-led 
initiatives based on the Swiss model as well as for reforms aimed at democratization and 
increased transparency on the EU-level (AfD, 10). Le Pen, on the other hand, admits to 
“want[ing] to destroy the EU.”34 While the AfD makes the euro and the disastrous effects of a 
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uniform monetary policy responsible for cross-European conflict, Le Pen charges that “Europe is 
war. Economic war. It is the increase of hostilities between the countries. . . That is not 
brotherhood” (Rohr). These problems are so fundamental that they cannot be solved by a mere 
reorganization of the Eurozone, only the introduction of a “Europe of nation-states” (Rohr) and 
the complete dissolution of the European Union would accomplish these goals. In the party’s 
manifesto, these radical ideas become pronounced in the FN’s commitment to “re-negotiate all 
EU treaties in order to claw back national sovereignty”.35 Dedicated to rejecting EU-initiated 
compromises to its national sovereignty and to restoring fully its autonomy within Europe, the 
FN curiously seeks the establishment of “a Pan-European Union of Sovereign States, to include 
Russia and Switzerland, but specifically not Turkey” (France24), a proposal that must be further 
analyzed within the context of anti-Americanism below. 
 
For UKIP, clearly, the present situation it seeks to change is notably different from that of 
Germany and France, which have adopted the common European currency. Hence, its proposals 
more closely resemble those of the FN than the euro-wary AfD. UKIP’s yearning for past times, 
where Britain was a global political superpower, manifests itself in its political program for this 
year’s British elections, UKIP Manifesto 2015. Specifically, it worries that “The longer we stay 
in the European Union, the more we become like ‘little Englanders,’ an isolated, insignificant, 
offshore province in a country called Europe. We become less and less like the ‘Great’ Britain 
we really are”.36 For UKIP, EU membership is directly associated with uncontrolled immigration 
resulting in higher unemployment rates, a sheer mass of environmental, occupational, and other 
regulations whose “burden can be overwhelming for small firms” (UKIP, 44) and, particularly as 
EU-membership was expanded to former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, a 
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decline in its political vote share.37 Additionally, it complains about the financial burden EU 
membership poses to the UK as a net contributor, alleging that leaving the EU would allow the 
country to “Save £9 billion a year” (UKIP, 8). 
 
Anti-Americanism 
Given a general association of the United States with globalization, particularly in the realms of 
popular culture, technology, and economics, anti-American attitudes would be a good indicator 
that the parties under examination are vehicles of anti-globalization. Conversely, however, UKIP 
clearly expresses a desire to “foster closer ties with the Anglosphere” (UKIP, 67), which is 
described as a “network of nations that share not merely our language but our common law, 
democratic traditions and global trading interests (UKIP, 67). Nevertheless, UKIP is a staunch 
supporter of increased national sovereignty, which it, like Le Pen, views as inherently 
encroached upon by the EU. As a result, UKIP’s manifesto speaks very critically about military 
endeavors conducted as part of the US-initiated “War on Terror.” Military excursions abroad are 
understood as “a sign that our political leaders are willing to put our troops in harm’s way at the 
behest of other countries’ political agendas (UKIP, 67). Clearly, improved American-British 
relationships would be pursued by a UKIP-led government, even if this would mean that support 
of American-led military actions may be more hesitant. Nevertheless, it deserves mention that 
while it is committed to greater political, economic, and military autonomy, UKIP repeatedly 
declares its continued support for NATO in its manifesto. 
 
Likewise, the AfD professes its desire to maintain an intimate security relationship with the US, 
stating “NATO is and remains the bond of a transatlantic security architecture whose crucial 
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anchor is the alliance with the USA.”38 However, it also expresses a need for a closer 
relationship with Russia to resolve problems in Eastern Europe. However, a resolution passed 
that calls for an end to European sanctions imposed on Russia, and to abstain from further 
measures designed to bind Ukraine and EU or Ukraine and Russia closer together, has led some 
to charge the party with anti-Americanism.39 The debate about a more pro-American or pro-
Russian course appears to divide the AfD deeply, and opinions differ significantly among even 
the party leadership, as a Die Welt article reports.40 Despite this intra-party dispute, the AfD’s 
official website expresses the importance of and its commitment to westward orientation. While 
criticism regarding the NSA data collection scandal is not surprising, the party’s decision to 
“reject a binding decision approving the free trade agreement with the USA,”41 which it deems 
as clearly disadvantageous to Europe, alleging that it would “reduce consumer and 
environmental protection, legal certainty, social standards and cultural policy” (AfD, 13), can 
definitely be construed as evidence of anti-globalization strands within the party. More than 
anything, however, the issue of the proposed free trade agreement between the EU and the US is 
yet another highly contested matter that demonstrates the emergence of intra-party cleavages: 
running counter to the party’s official program, Lucke has confirmed the party’s support for the 
agreement42. 
 
While UKIP is undeniably intent on further strengthening its relationship with the US, and the 
AfD is at least officially committed to maintaining close ties with its biggest Atlantic ally, the 
FN pursues a decidedly different course. “Aggressive promotion of the French language 
internationally to restore French influence abroad” is one policy that is designed to curb 
especially American influence across the globe; like UKIP, the FN appears to aim to reestablish 
Brandt: Populist Parties in Germany, France, and the UK
Published by ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2015
                                                                                                                                                                       Brandt 
  
20 
its former glory as a global empire. Not only is Le Pen’s party vehemently opposed to the 
spread of American culture, it is also wary of its political might, explaining that 
The Americans are trying to expand their influence in the world, particularly in Europe. 
They are defending their own interests, not ours. I am in favor of a multi-polar world in 
which France once again takes its position as the leader of non-aligned states, not with 
the US, not with Russia and not with Germany. One should strive to be neither slave nor 
master.43 
Given her open antipathy for the US and its influence, it comes as no surprise that Le Pen favors 
France’s withdrawal from NATO, and has declared that the FN’s and Russia’s foreign policy 
positions are in complete agreement.44 
 
Discussion 
Given each party’s established position on the four criteria selected for this paper, one can draw 
conclusions about whether they could justifiably be labeled the political frontrunners of national 
anti-globalization movements. Clearly, the French Front National is the most extreme of the 
three, and its radical policy proposals diverge quite considerably from the country’s mainstream 
parties. Unlike the FN, France’s biggest parties, the Socialists and UMP, are committed to EU 
integration and have promoted the euro as a common currency. In other areas, however, the FN’s 
positions, though radicalized, appear more in tune with general French attitudes. France is well-
known for its aggressive pursuit of laïcité that has already resulted in the ban of conspicuously 
religious symbols in public schools, as well as an act prohibiting facial concealment in the 
public, both of which were initiated by the conservative UMP and not the FN. These two laws 
can be viewed as “illustrative examples of the tense public climate regarding religious diversity 
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and Islam”.45 Hence, the FN’s aggressive policy positions, particularly on the immigration issue, 
may resonate more broadly among the French public, making the party more mainstream than an 
initial assessment may indicate. It is particularly the FN’s emphasis on Frenchness and French 
cultural superiority, its proposals to curb government programs benefitting non-citizens, and its 
anti-American stance that indicate a rejection of all forms of otherness, an idea that is clearly 
associated with anti-globalization. Moreover, considering the electoral gains Le Pen’s party has 
made under her new leadership, it is doubtful whether the FN’s nationalist attitudes can be 
viewed as merely a development on the fringes of French society. 
 
UKIP, similarly seeking greater national sovereignty and a restriction of immigration, could 
potentially also qualify as a leader of the British anti-globalization movement. There are, 
however, distinct differences that make such a designation seem erroneous and premature. A 
brief look at FN’s domestic economic policies, although not specifically addressed in this paper, 
shows that it seeks a much more protectionist approach than UKIP, which is politically and 
economically more internationally oriented. Of great importance regarding the matter at hand is 
also UKIP’s professed support for immigration in general, although under much stricter 
guidelines. In its manifesto, the party specifically stresses that immigration is beneficial and 
necessary for the UK, a striking difference to the French party’s adoption of what Bornschier 
describes as cultural differentialism.46 It is precisely the FN’s rejection of the other that makes it 
so distinctly anti-globalist. Because UKIP’s approach to these matters differs significantly, it 
should not be classified as principally anti-globalist, even if it contains elements that are more in 
line with the FN’s thinking. 
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An analysis of the AfD’s official party program shows a more restrained approach to German 
policy issues than the one pursued by the FN and even UKIP. A firm supporter of the 
continuation of a European monetary union, albeit thoroughly modified, the German party does 
not oppose the transfer of some national autonomy to the EU in principal. Moreover, its 
proposed immigration policy ought to be viewed as a response to globalization and to the rise in 
migrants across the world as a necessary consequence, and not inevitably as a negative and 
hostile reply. After all, even Germany’s mainstream parties have declared their intent to reform 
the country’s current policy on immigration and asylum given the rise in numbers. However, 
considering the party’s increasing factionalization over agenda points outside of the agreed-upon 
economic policy positions, it remains to be seen whether the AfD will lean further right in the 
future, or completely split into two opposing camps. 
 
Conclusion 
As the analysis shows, only the FN’s policy positions can be classified as undoubtedly anti-
globalist, with UKIP and AfD displaying much more moderate tendencies on that issue. Hence, 
the initial misgivings that the parties’ increasing popularity – with UKIP and the FN having 
made formidable electoral successes – would be indicative of broader support for anti-globalist 
movements cannot be affirmed. Nevertheless, studies have shown an increasing prevalence of 
Islamophobia in Europe, with Kunst et al.’s study asserting that fear of Islamization and 
Islamophobia in the media is especially pronounced in all three countries examined in this 
paper.47 Consequently, a future radicalization and the adoption of dichotomous thinking, 
distinguishing between “them” and “us” on an ethnic, religious, or cultural basis, is conceivable 
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in the UK, and to a lesser extent even in Germany, a country which, since 1945, has tended to 
avoid overtly patriotic gesture.  
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